Bayesian Epistemology
How expectations and evidence bear on the strength of a belief.
A recurring theme
What gives an account its weight? What lets it explain something, and what does it leave out?
This theme connects my interest in how beliefs change with my concern for what explanations actually accomplish. Evidence can support a claim without settling how to explain it. An explanation can illuminate one part of a situation while leaving another untouched.
I return to the relation between the question being asked, the material that can answer it, and the kind of understanding an answer offers.
These frameworks place different demands on an account. Their differences are part of what makes them useful to read together.
How expectations and evidence bear on the strength of a belief.
Which details make a difference, and which can be left out of an explanation.
Why an observable action is not yet an account of what it means.
Whether the details of an account constrain it or can be adjusted to fit anything.
What an explanation leaves outside its frame, and when those omissions matter.
Places where these questions take a more concrete form.
Working through belief revision as a redistribution of plausibility: a concrete account of how evidence changes confidence.
Places competing research programmes together, making it possible to ask why they disagree about what needs explaining.
Puts coverage statistics beside household accounts of connectivity. Their differences show why the choice of evidence changes the picture.