Maps
Where theories of cognition disagree
Separate disagreements about what cognition is, what counts as an explanation, and how to investigate it.
Two accounts of cognition can disagree at different levels. They might propose different mechanisms, accept different kinds of explanation, or draw the boundary of the cognitive system differently. Treating all of these as one dispute makes it harder to say what would settle any of them.
This map compares research programmes across those commitments. Its purpose is to locate a disagreement before trying to resolve it. The categories are working distinctions, and individual accounts may cross them.
A first orientation to the theories
Different accounts bring different features of cognition into focus: symbols and operations, functional organization, bodily activity, relations to the environment, prediction, or processes unfolding through time.
The overview below groups these emphases for browsing. Membership in a cluster does not make two theories equivalent, and placement in different clusters does not by itself make them incompatible. Each relationship is a question to investigate in the linked notes.
Explore the theory overview
From emphasis to disagreement
Knowing what an account foregrounds is a starting point. Comparing it with another requires a more specific question: do they disagree about what exists, about what an explanation should accomplish, or about how to investigate the phenomenon?
The five research programmes below organize that comparison. They are not a second classification of every theory in the overview. A position such as functionalism, or a claim about the boundaries of cognition, can intersect more than one programme. The three layers help locate what is actually at stake in a particular disagreement.
Three layers of disagreement
| Layer | What it settles | Example Disagreement |
|---|---|---|
| Ontological | What cognition is | Computation vs. coupling |
| Explanatory | What counts as explanation | Mechanism vs. optimality proof vs. phase portrait |
| Methodological | How to investigate | Behavioral experiments vs. dynamical modeling |
These come apart. Two researchers can share ontology (representationalism) but diverge on explanatory norms (mechanistic vs. computational-level). Different components have different rigidity.
The Five Programmes
Classical/Symbolic
Cognition is rule-governed symbol manipulation.
Connectionist
Cognition is pattern transformation across distributed representations.
Bayesian
Cognition is approximate optimal inference under uncertainty.
Embodied/Enactive
Cognition is inseparable from bodily action and environmental coupling.
Dynamical Systems
Cognition is continuous state-space evolution.
Programme Relations
Relations are a partial order, not pure rivalry:
- Bayesian & Connectionist: Complementary across Marr levels.
- Embodiment: Often about scope (boundaries) rather than mechanism.
- Dynamical Systems: A mathematical vocabulary applicable within multiple ontologies.
Before treating two programmes as rivals, ask whether they address the same explanatory task. Accounts at different levels may fit together, but compatibility still has to be established for the particular accounts being compared.
Case Study: Predictive Processing
PP attempts unification by straddling: Bayesian at computational level, Connectionist in implementation, Dynamical in mathematics.
However, there are limits to what it can absorb without becoming unfalsifiable:
- Radical enactivism's rejection of representational content.
- Strongly externalist claims where cognition crosses the skin.
- Social constitution of norms (are practices just "priors"?).
Hierarchy of Presupposition
| Level | Example | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Phenomenal | Behavioral regularities needing explanation | Minimal shared |
| Thin Theoretical | Adaptive coordination with environment | Already boundary-drawing |
| Thicker Framing | "Cognition", "Representation" | Contested |
| Programme-Specific | "How is X represented?" | Fully internal |
Critical Realism as Regulative Commitment
The question of usefulness
What does a framework help us investigate? Bracketing a dispute about what exists can make inquiry possible while leaving that dispute unresolved.
My Stance
Bracketing is epistemically modest, not ontologically deflationary. Cognitive mechanisms and social processes are real and stratified.
What this buys:
- Against instrumentalism: PP translating enactivism into priors might be wrong about the joints of reality, not just less useful.
- Differentiated realism: Methodology is instrumental; Ontology tracks real mechanisms.
- Unified stance: Experiments and ethnography are probing different strata of the same reality.